


Serve yourself!

Winbind improvements for
user token acquisition

Günther Deschner



Günther Deschner


- Software Engineer Manager at IBM
- Samba Team member since 2004
- Manages Ceph-SMB team

Where are my AD group memberships?




- Winbind's main mission:
 - Representation of Active Directory account data on Unix systems
- Expectation:
 - Availability of full group membership list
 - Completeness and accurateness of group membership
 - Independent of previous authentication
 - `id W2K25DOM\gd` should always give correct and accurate output
- User and groups are defined by SIDs, names as well as logon properties (principals, etc.) can change
- Unix needs to map SIDs to Unix IDs (idmapping)

DC Authorization Data



- Domain Controllers attach authorization data to successful authentication (when requested)
- NTLMSSP:
 - DCE/RPC `netr_Validation` returned via NETLOGON
 - `netr_LogonSamLogon()`
 - `netr_LogonSamLogonEx()`
 - `netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags()`
- Kerberos:
 - `PAC_LOGON_INFO` returned from AS-REP, TGS-REP calls
- Common subset of returned authorization data:
 - `netr_SamInfo3`



```
netr_SamInfo3: struct netr_SamInfo3
  base: struct netr_SamBaseInfo
    logon_time          : Fri Jan  9 14:50:45 2026 CET
    logoff_time         : Thu Sep 14 04:48:05 30828 CEST
    kickoff_time       : Thu Sep 14 04:48:05 30828 CEST
    last_password_change : Fri Jun 20 21:50:53 2025 CEST
    allow_password_change : Sat Jun 21 21:50:53 2025 CEST
    force_password_change : Thu Sep 14 04:48:05 30828 CEST
  account_name: struct lsa_String
    length      : 0x0004 (4)
    size        : 0x0004 (4)
    string      : *
    string      : 'gd'
  full_name: struct lsa_String
    length      : 0x0022 (34)
    size        : 0x0022 (34)
    string      : *
    string      : 'Guenther Deschner'
```



```
logon_script: struct lsa_String
    length          : 0x0000 (0)
    size            : 0x0000 (0)
    string          : *
        string      : ''
profile_path: struct lsa_String
    length          : 0x0000 (0)
    size            : 0x0000 (0)
    string          : *
        string      : ''
home_directory: struct lsa_String
    length          : 0x0000 (0)
    size            : 0x0000 (0)
    string          : *
        string      : ''
home_drive: struct lsa_String
    length          : 0x0000 (0)
    size            : 0x0000 (0)
    string          : *
        string      : ''
```




```
logon_count          : 0x0029 (41)
bad_password_count   : 0x0000 (0)
rid                  : 0x00000450 (1104)
primary_gid          : 0x00000201 (513)
groups: struct samr_RidWithAttributeArray
  count              : 0x00000003 (3)
  rids                : *
    rids: ARRAY(3)
      rids: struct samr_RidWithAttribute
        rid           : 0x00000201 (513)
        attributes    : 0x00000007 (7)
          1: SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
          1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
          1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED
          0: SE_GROUP_OWNER
          0: SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
          0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY
          0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY_ENABLED
          0: SE_GROUP_RESOURCE
          0x00: SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID (0)
```



```
rids: struct samr_RidWithAttribute
    rid                : 0x00000458 (1112)
    attributes         : 0x00000007 (7)
        1: SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
        1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
        1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED
        0: SE_GROUP_OWNER
        0: SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
        0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY
        0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY_ENABLED
        0: SE_GROUP_RESOURCE
    0x00: SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID (0)
```


```
rids: struct samr_RidWithAttribute
    rid                : 0x0000045a (1114)
    attributes         : 0x00000007 (7)
        1: SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
        1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
        1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED
        0: SE_GROUP_OWNER
        0: SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
        0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY
```



```
user_flags          : 0x00000220 (544)
    0: NETLOGON_GUEST
    0: NETLOGON_NOENCRYPTION
    0: NETLOGON_CACHED_ACCOUNT
    0: NETLOGON_USED_LM_PASSWORD
    1: NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS
    0: NETLOGON_SUBAUTH_SESSION_KEY
    0: NETLOGON_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
    0: NETLOGON_NTLMV2_ENABLED
    1: NETLOGON_RESOURCE_GROUPS
    0: NETLOGON_PROFILE_PATH_RETURNED
    0: NETLOGON_GRACE_LOGON
key: struct netr_UserSessionKey
    key: ARRAY(16): <REDACTED SECRET VALUES>
logon_server: struct lsa_StringLarge
    length          : 0x0012 (18)
    size            : 0x0014 (20)
    string          : *
        string      : 'GDW2K25DC'
```




```
logon_domain: struct lsa_StringLarge
    length          : 0x0010 (16)
    size            : 0x0012 (18)
    string          : *
        string      : 'W2K25DOM'
domain_sid        : *
    domain_sid      : S-1-5-21-3193548755-1705638237-2474812355
LMSessKey: struct netr_LMSessionKey
    key: ARRAY(8): <REDACTED SECRET VALUES>
acct_flags        : 0x00000210 (528)
    0: ACB_DISABLED
    0: ACB_HOMDIRREQ
    0: ACB_PWNOTREQ
    0: ACB_TEMPDUPLICATE
    1: ACB_NORMAL
    0: ACB_MNS
    0: ACB_DOMTRUST
    0: ACB_WSTRUST
    0: ACB_SVRTRUST
```



```
0: ACB_SVRTRUST
1: ACB_PWNOEXP
0: ACB_AUTOLOCK
0: ACB_ENC_TXT_PWD_ALLOWED
0: ACB_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED
0: ACB_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
0: ACB_NOT_DELEGATED
0: ACB_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY
0: ACB_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH
0: ACB_PW_EXPIRED
0: ACB_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
0: ACB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQD
0: ACB_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT
0: ACB_USE_AES_KEYS
sub_auth_status      : 0x00000000 (0)
last_successful_logon : NTTIME(0)
last_failed_logon    : NTTIME(0)
failed_logon_count   : 0x00000000 (0)
reserved              : 0x00000000 (0)
```



```
sidcount          : 0x00000002 (2)
sids              : *
  sids: ARRAY(2)
    sids: struct netr_SidAttr
      sid          : *
        sid        : S-1-18-2
      attributes   : 0x00000007 (7)
        1: SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
        1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
        1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED
        0: SE_GROUP_OWNER
        0: SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
        0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY
        0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY_ENABLED
        0: SE_GROUP_RESOURCE
        0x00: SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID (0)
```



```
sids: struct netr_SidAttr
  sid          : *
  sid          : S-1-5-21-3193548755-1705638237-2474812355-1115
  attributes   : 0x20000007 (536870919)
    1: SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
    1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
    1: SE_GROUP_ENABLED
    0: SE_GROUP_OWNER
    0: SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
    0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY
    0: SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY_ENABLED
    1: SE_GROUP_RESOURCE
  0x00: SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID      (0)
```

The netsamlogoncache



- Whenever user authenticates successfully we store info3 authorization data in netsamlogoncache.tdb
- samlogoncache entries are used extensively by winbind for various queries
- Cli frontend:
 - `net cache samlogon`
 - Commands for list, show, ndrump, delete
- Problems:
 - **Expiry:** Entries in that tdb do not expire, they're valid forever
 - **Consistency:** Database is not clustered, each node creates an independent cache
 - Entries are only overwritten when new data gets available
 - problematic for applications that cannot get samlogoncache entries to be written
 - MR: Allow netsamlogoncache.tdb to expire cache entries

https://gitlab.com/samba-team/samba/-/merge_requests/4399

Winbind LDAP lookups



- Winbind will always consult netsamlogoncache first
- When no entry is in the cache winbind attempts to lookup group membership itself via LDAP using three different mechanisms:
 - tokenGroups
 - memberOf
 - member

Winbind LDAP lookups - tokenGroups




- **Scope:** LDAP_SCOPE_BASE
- **Base DN:** CN=gd,CN=Users,DC=w2k25dom,DC=ber,DC=redhat,DC=com
- **Filter:** (objectclass=*)
- **Attributes:** tokenGroups
- **Example cli:**
 - `net ads sid S-1-5-21-3193548755-1705638237-2474812355-1104 -P
tokengroups`

Winbind LDAP lookups -memberOf



- **Scope:** LDAP_SCOPE_BASE
- **Base DN:** CN=gd,CN=Users,DC=w2k25dom,DC=ber,DC=redhat,DC=com
- **Filter:** (objectclass=*)
- **Attributes:** memberof;Range=0-*
- Query makes use of ranged attribute ranged LDAP searches
- Example cli:
 - `net ads dn CN=gd,CN=Users,DC=w2k25dom,DC=ber,DC=redhat,DC=com --extended-dn 'memberof;Range=0-*' -P`

Winbind LDAP lookups - member



- **Scope:** LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE
- **Base DN:** CN=Users,DC=w2k25dom,DC=ber,DC=redhat,DC=com
- **Filter:**

```
(& (member=CN=gd,CN=Users,DC=w2k25dom,DC=ber,DC=redhat,DC=com) (objectCategory=group) (groupType:dn:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648) )
```
- **Attributes:** objectSid
- **Use of extended dn LDAP control to get distinguished names including SID and GUID attributes**
- **Example cli:**
 - net ads search


```
" (& (member=CN=gd,CN=Users,DC=w2k25dom,DC=ber,DC=redhat,DC=com) (objectCategory=group) (groupType:dn:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648) )" -P  
objectSid
```

Winbind LDAP lookups - and?



- All these LDAP lookups do not reliably deliver the accurate list of group membership SIDs
 - Permissions
 - Nested memberships
 - Etc.
- Even if they would, we cannot compose a full info3 structure out of these LDAP results
- **=> Much better option is not rely on LDAP but to use Krb5 S4U2SELF**

S4U2SELF Kerberos Extension



- “The S4U2self extension allows a service to obtain a service ticket to itself on behalf of a user” [MS-SFU]
- **Service/itself:**
 - Winbind, authenticated using machine account name and machine account password
- **User:**
 - User account to retrieve authorization information for
- Krb5 control flow:
 - AS-REQ -> AS-REP
 - TGS-REQ
 - PA-FOR-USER / PA-S4U-X509-USER
 - TGS-REP
 - PAC-LOGON-INFO

S4U2SELF krb5 API



- Both Kerberos libraries support S4U2SELF APIs
- krb5.h:
 - **Heimdal:**
 - `krb5_get_creds_opt_set_impersonate()`
 - **MIT:**
 - `krb5_get_credentials_for_user()`
- gssapi_ext.h:
 - `gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name()/gss_add_cred_impersonate_name()`
- MIT asynchronous S4U client (Alexander Bokovoy):
 - <https://github.com/krb5/krb5/pull/1500>

S4U2SELF krb5 cli



- Samba provides S4U2SELF impersonation cli since many years:
- `net ads kerberos pac dump impersonate=$UPN -P`
 - only displays PAC info3, does not store information
- `userPrincipalName` always required for `s4u2self` operations

The user principal name



- Optional `userPrincipalName` LDAP attribute
- When not set:
 - `$sAMAccountname@$REALM`
 - [gd@W2K25DOM.BER.REDHAT.COM](#)
- Role of `upnSuffixes`
- Any arbitrary suffix might be chosen by AD admins
 - [COMPLETELY.RANDOM.EXAMPLE.COM](#)
- `gd@COMPLETELY.RANDOM.EXAMPLE.COM`

DRSUAPI Cracknames



- DRSUAPI DCE/RPC interface
- Only accessibly via ncacn_ip_tcp: transport and privacy
- DsCrackNames interface allows lookup of all sorts
 - Input:
 - `DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_SID_OR_SID_HISTORY`
 - Output:
 - `DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_USER_PRINCIPAL`
- Add DRSUAPI client to winbind
- `wbinfo -sid-to-upn <SID>`

Potentially blocking krb5 calls



- Kerberos libraries behavior w.r.t. DNS lookup and networking cannot be controlled by Samba
- Move potentially blocking krb5 calls to new separate winbind child process (log.winbind-kerberos)
- New winbind call for s4u2self impersonation:

```
NTSTATUS wbint_KerberosImpersonationToken(  
    [in,string,charset=UTF 8] char *impersonate_principal,  
    [out,ref] wbint_SidArray *sids,  
    [out,unique] netr_SamInfo3 **info3  
);
```

Demo



Current limitations & next steps




- **Limitations:**

- Only supports single realm scenarios
(requester and impersonation account reside in the same domain)
- UPN suffixes not fully supported

- **Next steps:**

- Fully support upn suffixes
- Convince metze!
- Adopt and test Alexanders new async API
- Cleanup MR and get review



Samba Upstream Contributions:

- Draft: Add Kerberos impersonation support to Winbindd to retrieve user group membership
https://gitlab.com/samba-team/samba/-/merge_requests/4318

MIT Kerberos Contributions:

- MIT Kerberos Consortium: Projects/Services4User
<https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Services4User>
- Asynchronous S4U interfaces PR from Alexander Bokovoy
- <https://github.com/krb5/krb5/pull/1500>

Documentation:

- [MS-SFU]: Kerberos Protocol Extensions: Service for User and Constrained Delegation Protocol
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/3bff5864-8135-400e-bdd9-33b552051d94
- [MS-PAC]: Privilege Attribute Certificate Data Structure
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pac/166d8064-c863-41e1-9c23-edaaa5f36962
- [MS-KILE]: Kerberos Protocol Extensions
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9
- [MS-DRSR]: Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/f977faaa-673e-4f66-b9bf-48c640241d47



Questions?